Circassia at the Crossroads of Civilizations: From Historical Memory to Realpolitik

The Strategic Role of Circassia Through the Prism of the Past and Present

In the previous article of this series, timed to coincide with another tragic anniversary of the exile of the Circassians from their Homeland, we briefly recounted the history of the conquest of Circassia by the Russian Empire. Today, we will discuss the motives behind Russia’s seizure of our lands in the 18th and 19th centuries and its ongoing desire to keep the region under its rule.

Let us begin immediately with the key, summarizing thesis: for Moscow, the North Caucasus is not just a periphery; it is the southern strategic node of Russian statehood. Whoever controls this territory gains a military foothold, a buffer zone, a demographic reserve, access to the Black Sea, and control over communications connecting Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia. It is no exaggeration to say that Circassia lies at the intersection of civilizations. This is precisely why Russia did not come to the Caucasus by chance. The Empire moved there driven by the logic of grand strategy. We can list several specific reasons:

First, it needed to secure its southern flank against the Ottoman Empire and Persia.
Second, it aimed to gain control over the Black Sea coast.
Third, it sought to establish a land connection with the South Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia).
Fourth, it wanted to prevent the emergence of a hostile or independent mountainous belt in the Caucasus that could become an ally to external powers.

Thus, it is clear that the Russian-Caucasian War—along with its most crucial part, the final subjugation of Circassia and the expulsion of a significant portion of Circassians to the Ottoman Empire—was not merely a localized military campaign, but an act of geopolitical restructuring of a massive region.

Now, regarding the role of Circassia. The very existence of our Homeland blocked Russia’s path to full dominance on the northeastern coast of the Black Sea. As long as Circassia—which held the territory between the Don River, the foothills, the mountain passes, and the sea—maintained its independence, or at least its capacity for resistance, the Russian presence on the Black Sea remained incomplete. It is no coincidence that the struggle for Anapa, the coastline, the Kuban line, and the mountainous areas was so prolonged and brutal. Circassia was a buffer between Russia and southern powers, and Russian interest in the coast and the elimination of an independent Circassia was purely strategic.

Today, this logic has not disappeared. It is supported by the development of infrastructure, social services, and state propaganda, as well as by the mechanism of military domination. The North Caucasus is integrated into Russia’s Southern Military District, which covers the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, the North Caucasus, and Russian military positions in adjacent regions. The 58th Combined Arms Army, headquartered in Vladikavkaz, serves as the instrument of control over the eastern Caucasus, the Georgian direction, and Russia’s southern military communications. This army is considered one of the most combat-ready in the Russian Armed Forces, and the country’s authorities take its resupply very seriously. The reason is simple: if Russia loses firm control over the North Caucasus, it loses its defense in depth in the south. In other words, it becomes more vulnerable to an invasion from this direction, because everything north of the Caucasus Mountains is a plain crossed by rivers but generally easy to traverse all the way to Moscow. As you might imagine, the inhabitants of the Kremlin find this prospect highly unappealing.

However, the military role of the territory is only one layer of the grand strategy. There is also logistics. Following the outbreak of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the significance of the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and the Caspian direction grew dramatically. The region is now a critical connector between Europe, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Eastern Mediterranean. From the south, Russia also projects influence over the Black Sea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Armenia, the Caspian, the Iranian direction, and the Middle East. It is also important to note that Russia exports a significant share of its petroleum products through the Black Sea and Azov ports: for example, in 2024, they accounted for about 38% of Russia’s seaborne petroleum product exports. Novorossiysk alone accounted for around 17%. This brings billions of dollars to the state budget annually. It is no coincidence that Ukraine is currently regularly striking this very port.

There is also a moral factor: the loss of the Caucasus would mean not only a territorial concession or a weakening of the country’s defense capabilities. Among other things, for Moscow, the North Caucasus is a symbol of imperial continuity and a vital psychological boundary. Leaving the Caucasus would signal the collapse of the very model of Russian statehood, risking a surge of separatism and the subsequent fragmentation of the country in other directions as well. We proceed from the assumption that for any central authority in Moscow, this is a painful and unacceptable scenario.

So, after examining all components of the issue, the question “will Russia give up the Caucasus easily?” has an obvious answer for us: no, it will not.

This naturally leads to the next question:
Under what conditions might Russia withdraw from the Caucasus or be weakened in the south?

As we know, all empires fall sooner or later, and Russia is clearly no exception to this historical pattern. This means that the Circassians will also one day have a chance to revive their country and secure an independent future. However, for the purposes of today’s analysis, it is better to think in terms of scenarios rather than slogans or well-wishes.

The first scenario is a profound transformation of Russia itself, which does not necessarily mean an immediate collapse. This could involve a defeat in a major war, the exhaustion of the center, a split among elites, a severe economic crisis, a loss of governability, and subsequent federalization or transformation into a confederation. In such a case, the Caucasus could gain more autonomy through a redistribution of power from a weakened center to the regions. This would give our people in their historical Homeland more rights and opportunities to preserve their native language and culture. One of the factors that could lead to the weakening of the center and the realization of this scenario can already be seen today: Russia is fighting an unsuccessful war against Ukraine.

The second scenario is the foreign policy containment of southern Russia in a pincer movement. If Moscow loses its positions in the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and the Caspian region, and if Turkey, the EU, the US, Ukraine, and the states of the South Caucasus and Central Asia forge a new communication architecture without Russia, then the North Caucasus will gradually turn from a stronghold into a vulnerable salient. This does not automatically mean independence for the peoples of the Caucasus; in fact, it could even lead to a strengthening of the repressive apparatus in the region. Still, it creates a window of opportunity to strengthen the political agency of the Circassians. Let us try to explain the logic guiding us here: the stronger the external players in the region become, and the weaker Moscow appears in comparison, the more often local elites will start thinking about full independence, or at least about expanding their rights and increasing autonomy in local decision-making. We are already seeing some early glimpses of this second scenario, particularly in the rapprochement between Baku and Yerevan mediated by Ankara.

In the most extreme development of these scenarios, full independence could become a topic of discussion, but for the near-term (3-5 years) and medium-term (up to 10-15 years), such an outcome still seems unlikely to us.

The third scenario is not so much a separate path as a complement to the previous two: the internal maturation of the peoples of the region themselves. Without political organization, an intellectual elite, a shared agenda, demographic stability, and international ties, even the weakening of Russia will not guarantee liberation. History knows many cases where an empire grew weak, but smaller nations were not ready to seize the opportunity. The weakness of the center does not inherently create freedom. It merely opens up a space that is filled by whoever is best organized. Our task is precisely to be ready for that moment.

Initial Conditions and the General Outline of an Action Strategy

Circassians today find themselves in an unusual position. In our homeland, we are divided among several subjects of the Russian Federation: Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adygea, the Krasnodar Territory, and other parts of historical Circassia. According to official 2021 census data, the total Adyghe population in Russia is 751,487. Russian statistics count Kabardians, Circassians, Adyghe, and Shapsugs as separate categories, although it is, of course, more accurate to view all of us as parts of a single Adyghe/Circassian nation. At the same time, the majority lives outside the historical homeland—in Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Europe, the US, and other countries. Estimates of the diaspora’s size vary wildly, but we can confidently speak of millions of people.

This is simultaneously a weakness and a strength. It is a weakness because our people are severed administratively, demographically, and geographically. It is a strength because we possess an external resource: a diaspora, memory, international connections, a cultural network, and human capital in various countries. Many peoples of the North Caucasus do not have such a massive overseas base of support. We do. But a resource only becomes a strength when it is skillfully organized.

An analysis of our situation allows us to put forward several points and proposals at once. It will come as no surprise that the role of Circassians in the homeland is to preserve the core. This means the language, the land, memory, social ties, institutions, local elites, education, demography, and cultural visibility. Without a strong core in the homeland, the diaspora will gradually fade into a romantic memory. The role of the diaspora is to act as an external amplifying circuit for the nation: lobbying, writing articles and books on national revival, funding cultural and educational projects, creating think tanks, conducting international legal and informational advocacy, promoting repatriation in the public sphere, preserving the language, and connecting the Circassian issue with the broader themes of decolonization, indigenous rights, and historical justice. But here, it is crucial to avoid two extremes. The first extreme is passive loyalism: “there is nothing we can do, we just have to adapt.” This stance will gradually lead to our assimilation. The second extreme is romantic maximalism: the expectation of Russia’s imminent collapse and the instant restoration of historical justice. This stance is dangerous because it substitutes fruitless emotion and passive waiting for a sober, working strategy.

We believe that the most realistic path is long-term institutional work.

What can be done in the current circumstances?

First, build a robust Circassian analytical infrastructure: research groups, databases, and continuous monitoring of demography, the economy, land issues, repression, migration, the state of the language, and cultural policy. A nation that does not measure its own condition and fails to develop adequate action scenarios for the future cannot control its destiny. This is exactly the kind of analysis we are undertaking with you now, and we hope the work of our Center for Strategic Studies will benefit the cause of our national revival. We also welcome the initiatives of other similar Circassian organizations in this direction.

Second, we must articulate a multi-level political program. The minimum level is the defense of language, culture, historical memory, the diaspora’s right of return, and the development of national education. The medium level is the administrative and cultural consolidation of Circassian territories in the historical Homeland, at least in the form of coordinating institutions. The maximum level is the nation’s right to self-determination in the event of a radical transformation of Russia. All three levels do not contradict each other; they correspond to different windows in history.

Third, we must work with the neighboring peoples of the North Caucasus. We will discuss this point in greater detail another time, but the most important thing must be said right now: a Circassian strategy must not be isolationist. The Caucasus is a mosaic, and any attempt to build a future against all neighbors is doomed. We need a language of mutual guarantees: land, security, respect for memory, the prevention of ethnic revenge, and the protection of the religious and national rights of all communities.

Fourth, it is time to transition from folklore-based self-organization to a political and intellectual one. This primarily concerns the diaspora, as conditions for such work do not currently exist in the Homeland. Dances, flags, commemorative dates, and cultural festivals are important, but they are not enough. We need lawyers, historians, lobbyists, journalists, documentary filmmakers, specialists in international organizations, and people capable of speaking with Ankara, Amman, Brussels, Washington, Kyiv, Tbilisi, and Baku. The Circassian issue must not sound like a grievance repeated year after year, but as a part of a larger theme: empire, deportation, historical memory, the right of return, cultural survival, Black Sea security, the future of the Caucasus, and the post-Russian architecture of Eurasia. Here, it is vital to conduct rigorous talent selection and help one another establish the appropriate political, human rights, and other structures capable of carrying out work in our shared interests.

These are, in our view, some general thoughts and specific recommendations for improving the strategic position of the Circassians. We will continue our analysis and propose strategies for solving our national problems in future materials from the Center for Strategic Studies.

Summary and Parting Words

Russia holds onto the North Caucasus because, without it, its southern strategy is incomplete, and historical Circassia has been and remains one of the key zones of this space. Moscow will not leave there voluntarily under normal conditions, but all empires eventually loosen their grip on conquered peoples. They leave when the balance of power shifts, when maintaining the territory becomes more expensive than controlling it, when local peoples become politically mature, and when the outside world recognizes their agency.

Therefore, our task now is not to wait for a miraculous moment, but to prepare for it by preserving our language and traditions and strengthening the ties between the homeland and the diaspora. We must build educational, human rights, political, and charitable organizations imbued with concrete purpose and action, cultivate new personnel, and promote our representatives in international organizations.

Dear compatriots! We must not burn our energy in empty arguments among ourselves—there is enough constructive work for everyone, even if we have different views on the priorities of this or that activity. Let us remember that we are living in a time of great change. History may well give us a chance, but we must also be capable of seizing it.

Адыгэ лъэпкъыр псэущ! (Long live the Circassian nation!)
Center for Strategic Studies of the Circassian sociopolitical organization “Khabze”.