Paul Goble: Circassians Are Strengthening Their Positions as the Most Organized Non-Russian Movement in Russia

For at least the past decade, the Circassians have positioned themselves as a nation ready to lead a movement of colonized peoples seeking liberation from Moscow’s domination. The events of the last twelve months have only reinforced this trajectory. This is largely due to the convergence of three crucial sources of strength for the Circassian people in their struggle against Russian occupation: the growing drive of the seven-million-strong diaspora for unity on an anti-imperialist basis; the expansion of cooperation between Circassian activists and other nationalities (both within their home republics and beyond); and the forging of ties with states committed to justice and independence for subjugated peoples. This combination of factors, which has become especially pronounced over the past year, is unparalleled among other non-Russian nations within the current borders of the Russian Federation.

Firstly, the Circassians historically possess two key advantages: a diaspora of seven million and a population of around 700,000 in their historical homeland within the Russian Federation, administratively divided into three republics: Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and Adygea. Thus, in attempting to suppress the national movement, Moscow is forced to fight on two fronts: against the diaspora and against the residents of the homeland. With each passing year, both sides are acting in greater coordination, and their accumulated experience only strengthens their drive for independence.

Over the past year, these two parts of the Circassian world have become even more adept at countering Russian political infiltration and disinformation. Today, they truly represent a unified nation ready to stand against Moscow. One striking example was the historic meeting of Syrian Circassians in Damascus following the fall of the Assad regime, which received support from the massive Circassian diaspora in Turkey, estimated to number between 3 and 5 million.

Secondly, due to circumstances and their own traditions, the Circassians have learned to cooperate with other nationalities to a greater extent than other peoples in the Russian Federation. To control the Circassians, Soviet authorities grouped them with other peoples into so-called “bi-national” republics (Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia still exist today). Moscow hoped this would fragment the nation and provoke conflicts with neighbors, but the opposite occurred. Kabardians and Circassians overwhelmingly share a common identity, and their leaders—both out of necessity and national tradition—have built close cooperation with neighboring peoples. This trend has only become more pronounced over the past year.

Thirdly, the Circassians have realized that achieving their goals depends directly not only on internal cooperation within the Russian Federation but also on the support of the international community. Friendly nations such as Jordan, with its significant Circassian population, and Turkey, which hosts the largest diaspora, stand out. But contacts with two countries that were once under Moscow’s rule—Ukraine and Lithuania—are of particular importance. Circassian activists are actively working with Kyiv to secure official recognition of the 1864 expulsion of Circassians from the North Caucasus as an act of genocide, and they count on Ukraine’s support in advancing this issue internationally. Over the last year, Circassians have arguably become some of the most active allies of Ukrainian efforts. Establishing strong contacts with other states has injected the movement with tremendous additional energy.

Moreover, the Circassians have achieved significant success in developing contacts with the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. On December 17, the Seimas will host an international conference in Vilnius titled “The Circassian Genocide in the Context of History and Modern Politics.” Circassians view this event as a turning point in their struggle. According to Circassian activist Kase Kik, through this gathering, “for the first time, a European Union member state not only acknowledges the significance of the Circassian tragedy but also creates an international forum to discuss the genocide, exile, and the restoration of historical justice that has been awaited for over 160 years.” This event will mark “the moment when the Circassian diaspora can speak loud and with one voice: not scattered and not just locally, but on the level of global politics and international law.”

“For the Kremlin,” he continues, “this event is a painful signal. For decades, Moscow has ignored the Circassian issue, attempting to erase the memory of the genocide and hiding behind phrases like ‘tragic circumstances’ and ‘historical complexities’. This international conference translates the problem into the clear language of politics, law, and accountability. It is no longer a subject that can simply be met with silence.”

Clearly, Moscow is seriously concerned and is already taking a series of measures to counter the growing activity of the Circassians and their international support. Russian propagandists have predictably intensified their campaign against Circassian “separatists.” However, a far greater concern is that Russian authorities are deliberately working to sow division among the titular nationalities of the bi-national republics and are using far-right Russian nationalists to provoke unrest.

But, as is often the case with the repressive measures of Putin’s regime, these steps will likely prove counterproductive. They will only compel the Circassians to work even harder to strengthen ties between the diaspora and the homeland, expand cooperation with other peoples within the Russian Federation, and seek backing from states sympathetic to their cause. This means that the events of late 2025 will likely prove even more fateful for the future of the Circassians in 2026 than even the most optimistic activists and supporters currently anticipate.