The Constitution of the KBR and the Circassian World: Why We Cannot Be Silent

The Future of Kabardino-Balkaria Is Under Threat

Without exaggeration, the KBR is a key state-administrative unit among those established on the territory of historical Circassia. This is primarily because it concentrates the largest and most politically organized body of the Circassian population in the North Caucasus: the Circassians of Kabarda (Kabardians) make up the majority of the republic’s population, Nalchik remains one of the main cultural, educational, and socio-political centers of the Circassian world, and the republic itself possesses fully fledged state-administrative institutions – a Constitution, parliament, government, official languages, symbols, and a system of national-cultural representation. Unlike Adygea, where Circassians are a minority, and Karachay-Cherkessia, where the Circassian factor is embedded in a more complex multi-ethnic balance, the KBR remains the territory where Circassian historical memory, demographics, language, political status, and administrative form are most closely united. Therefore, any blow to its constitutional status is inevitably perceived not just as an internal legal issue of the republic, but as a question of the future of the entire Circassian world.

This is precisely why the news that the process of amending the republic’s Constitution had begun resonated so painfully. Formally, it is about aligning certain provisions with federal legislation, but in essence, the issue is far more serious: what remains of the republic’s constitutional status, of its historical subjectivity, and of the legal language with which Kabardino-Balkaria can protect itself, its territory, its internal structure, and the rights of its peoples?

Thus, the question is not: “How do we technically align the Constitution of the KBR with federal norms?” The right question is different: who decided, and on what grounds, that the republic must silently be stripped of the formulas that for decades have designated its territorial integrity, statehood, and internal subjectivity?

To put it simply, they want to remove several crucial conceptual and legal pillars from the Constitution of the KBR: first, the provision guaranteeing the integrity and inviolability of the territory of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic – that is, the republican constitutional formula that establishes the special significance of preserving the KBR’s territory; second, the provision on preserving the statehood of the KBR as a vital function of the state, which affects the very idea of the republic as a unique historical-political entity within the Russian Federation, rather than just an administrative unit; third, the formula defining the Head of the KBR as the “head of state and executive power,” reflecting the further adaptation of the republic’s status to the general federal model where the regional leader is viewed primarily as the highest official of a constituent entity of the RF; and fourth, the provisions regarding the role of the Head of the KBR in protecting the statehood, territorial integrity, and security of the republic, including in the text of their oath of office.

Our position on this matter is absolutely clear: the Constitution of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic must not be touched. These provisions must remain in their current wording because they are not random phrases, but part of the political-legal foundation of the republic. If the authorities consider this matter so important that they are willing to change key articles of the Basic Law, then it can only be resolved through the direct will of the people – through a referendum.

The Center for Strategic Studies under the “Khabze” public organization has analyzed this initiative by the Russian authorities. Today, we present a brief briefing on the public reaction, outline our vision, and offer a series of recommendations to resolve the emerging disagreements in a legal and civilized manner.

Chronology of events so far

According to officially published information, on June 2 of this year, the parliament of the KBR sustained the protest of Prosecutor Nikolay Khabarov against the provisions of the republic’s Constitution concerning guarantees of the integrity and inviolability of the KBR’s territory, the preservation of statehood as a vital function of the state, the status of the Head of the KBR as head of state, as well as the Head’s powers to ensure territorial integrity and security of the republic. A working group is being established to draft the amendments.

According to KBR Prosecutor Nikolay Khabarov, the need to adjust the republic’s Constitution did not arise suddenly: relevant information had previously been sent to the Head of the KBR, and on March 23, 2026, the prosecutor’s protest was formally submitted to the parliament.

On June 10, a group of public figures – including Marks Shakhmurzov, Khakim Kuchmezov, Valery Khatazhukov, Muzarib Bzhakhov, Ismel Meshev, Zaurbek Kozhev, Zaudin Tokov, Mukhamed Berkhamov, Azamat Shormanov, Alim Pshibiev, and others – issued a joint statement to the Head of the KBR and the members of parliament. They called the decision erroneous and dangerous, stating that the Constitution of the Russian Federation itself recognizes a republic as a “state,” as Article 5 states: “A republic (state) shall have its own constitution and legislation.”

In addition, many Circassian activists and ordinary citizens have openly spoken out in defense of the Republic’s Constitution. The role of the Circassian diaspora will be discussed in more detail below. A wave of discussions regarding these amendments has also swept through social media, with the public’s attitude toward them being overwhelmingly negative.

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to all organizations, public figures, activists, and private individuals – both in the homeland and in the diaspora – who have already stood up in defense of Kabardino-Balkaria’s constitutional guarantees and our national interests.

Why is what is happening of such great significance?

Because this is not a technical edit or a “legal detail.” The core of the matter runs much deeper: formulas that emerged from the post-Soviet treaty model of federalism of 1992, which established the republic not merely as an administrative unit but as an entity with its own historical-political statehood within the Russian Federation, are being purged from the KBR Constitution. The Prosecutor’s Office and federal legal logic view these norms as an exceeding of the subject’s competence. Public figures and many residents of the KBR view them as the republic’s last symbolic-legal “shield.”

In politics and law, formulations are not empty words. A constitution is not only a legal document; it is also a map of meanings: who we are, what our status is, what our guarantees are, what is considered permissible, and what requires extreme caution.

Yes, the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic is not an independent state. It is a constituent entity of the Russian Federation. This is obvious, and no responsible public figure, including representatives of the Circassian national movement, replaces this issue with empty slogans or dangerous rhetoric. But another point is equally obvious: a republic within the Russian Federation is not just an oblast and not just an administrative territory. The Constitution of the RF explicitly states: “A republic (state) shall have its own constitution and legislation.”

Thus, although the KBR does not possess external sovereignty and cannot act as an independent state on the international stage, within the federal structure it has a special constitutional status, its own historical and legal form, as well as its own system of symbols, institutions, and guarantees. This is why the issue cannot be reduced to whether we can mechanically remove a few lines from the republican Constitution. The question is what exactly we are removing and what political-legal reality we are creating as a result.

If words about territorial integrity, statehood, and the responsibility of the highest authority for civil peace and internal stability disappear from the republic’s Basic Law, then the Circassians, and society as a whole, have the right to ask: why is this being done? What consequences will it have? What guarantees will be offered in return? Why is an issue of such magnitude being decided without broad and calm public discussion?

For the Adygs (Circassians), who survived a devastating war, genocide, and the exile of most of the survivors from their native lands, these questions sound particularly acute and alarming.

Russian legislation has indeed changed over the past decades. The federal model of the early 1990s, when republics had a much more pronounced treaty and political status, was gradually replaced by a model of a unified vertical structure of public power. From this perspective, the old formulas in the constitutions of the republics may be perceived as a relic of a bygone era.

But here the main question arises: does this mean that the republic must completely abandon its own constitutional language of protection? Should Kabardino-Balkaria stop speaking about the integrity of its territory simply because the integrity of the Russian Federation is protected at the federal level? We do not think so, and nothing in Russian legislation indicates this.

We proceed from the following: protecting the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and establishing the territorial integrity of a constituent entity of the Federation are not the same thing. The protection of the former pertains to the state as a whole. Establishing the latter pertains to the internal structure of the federation and the stability of the constituent entity itself. The republic, while recognizing itself as part of Russia, has the right to establish that its territory is not arbitrary administrative material that can be reshaped without regard for historical, national, social, and legal contexts.

This is precisely why we view what is happening not as a manifestation of unavoidable state necessity, but as a serious political-legal error committed, perhaps, by individual departments and officials who look at the KBR Constitution too narrowly – as a set of formulations subject to mechanical purging. But a republic is not a clerical document. Here, every word about territory, statehood, and internal consensus is bound to historical memory, inter-ethnic balance, and people’s trust in authority. It is not too late to halt this process, review the prosecutor’s protest, move the issue out of the realm of departmental pressure, and transition it into an open socio-legal dialogue. This would not be a sign of weakness of the authorities, but a sign of their maturity and ability to listen to the people.

Why this is particularly sensitive for the KBR

Kabardino-Balkaria is a republic with two titular nations, a complex history, the memory of the deportation of the Balkar people, the Circassian historical trauma, issues of land, districts, representation, language, identity, and inter-ethnic balance. In such a republic, the words “territory,” “integrity,” “statehood,” “civil peace,” and “harmony” are not decorative. They perform a stabilizing function and remind both the authorities and society: here, one cannot act crudely, mechanically, without taking historical experience and internal balance into account.

If these words disappear from the Constitution, Adygs (Circassians) and Balkars naturally feel anxiety about their future. Not because they necessarily expect a catastrophe tomorrow, but because they see a general trend: the special status of the republics is gradually being weakened, regional subjectivity is shrinking, all political and legal differences are being aligned to a single administrative template, and an anxious uncertainty looms ahead, exacerbated further by the war.

The Russian Federation as a political construct cannot be vital if all its constituent entities are turned into identical cells of administration. The meaning of federalism lies precisely in the fact that different territories have different histories, different population compositions, different forms of self-government, and different ways of maintaining internal peace.

The history of dismantling the KBR’s republican subjectivity

To understand the scale of what is happening today, one must see not only the current initiative of the prosecutor’s office to amend the Constitution of the KBR, but the entire long chain of concessions, losses, and dismantling that Kabardino-Balkaria has gone through since the collapse of the USSR. In the early 1990s, the republic entered the new Russian statehood not as a regular administrative territory, but as a republic with its own Constitution, president, parliament, formulas of statehood, territorial integrity, and political subjectivity. In 1994, a treaty was concluded between the Russian Federation and the KBR on the delimitation of jurisdictions and the mutual delegation of powers. In simple terms, this meant that the republic had not just a “favor from above,” but a special treaty framework for relations with Moscow, which defined its powers, its area of responsibility, and its own political-legal weight.

Then, in the early 2000s, under the slogan of “aligning regional legislation with federal law,” the first major purge of regional autonomy began: treaty-based federation began to recede into the past, special agreements between subjects and Moscow lost their significance, and regional constitutions began to be tailored to a single vertical line of power. The termination of the 1994 treaty was one of the first heavy blows: from that moment on, the KBR was no longer a party to a special federal deal but was increasingly transformed into just another managed region in the general federal order.

Next came the blow to the political mandate. First, the very idea of directly electing the head of the republic was weakened, and in 2004, a procedure was established in the KBR Constitution whereby the head of the republic is elected not directly by the people, but by deputies of the parliament from candidates put forward through the federal center. That is, the population of the KBR effectively ceased to be the primary source of political legitimacy for the highest official of the republic.

Parallel to this, the symbolic height of republican power was also dismantled: the office of the President of the KBR was replaced by the Head of the KBR. This is not a minor detail, not a question of a signboard, and not a dispute over words, because in politics, words define status: “President of the Republic” sounded like the bearer of its own statehood, while “Head of the Subject” sounds increasingly like a regional administrator within the vertical structure. The next major blow was the abolition of the Constitutional Court of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic – a native body that could interpret the KBR Constitution, consider issues of conformity of republican laws with its Basic Law, and by its very existence demonstrate that the republic possessed its own constitutional order. On January 1, 2022, this institution was liquidated, and the republic was stripped of its internal constitutional shield – a mechanism that could at least legally signify that the KBR has not just an administration, but its own legal subjectivity.

Then began the integration of regions and municipalities into the “unified system of public power.” In plain language, this means the following: local self-government and regional authority act less and less as independent levels of popular self-organization and increasingly become the lower tiers of a single administrative pyramid.

And now, the very last conceptual pillars of the KBR Constitution are under attack – the provisions on the integrity and inviolability of the republic’s territory, on the preservation of statehood, on the status of the Head as head of state, and on their powers to ensure territorial integrity and security.

In other words, the republic was first stripped of the treaty basis of its relations with Moscow, then the direct popular mandate of its leader, then the presidential symbolism, then its own Constitutional court, then its authority and local self-government were increasingly integrated into the general vertical, and now they propose to remove the very language by which the KBR could speak of itself as a republic with territory, statehood, and internal political subjectivity.

The interim result of this process is harsh, but it must be named honestly: Kabardino-Balkaria still retains its name, flag, coat of arms, parliament, government, and formal attributes of a republic, but from within, these attributes are gradually being stripped of real protective content. The republic remains a shell from which mechanisms of independence are being extracted step by step. And the main question today is not just what exactly will be removed from the text of the Constitution, but what might be removed tomorrow.

If society becomes accustomed to silence, if deputies play the role of notaries for decisions already made, if experts limit themselves to cautious comments, and national and public organizations fail to explain to the people the cost of what is happening, then the next stage could involve not just words in the Constitution, but real issues of land, borders, municipal structure, the status of settlements, personnel control, distribution of powers, and the internal balance between the peoples of Kabardino-Balkaria.

This is precisely why the current amendments cannot be viewed as a technical legal procedure: they represent yet another line of retreat, after which the space of republican subjectivity may become even narrower, and the price of the next concession will be even higher.

It cannot be ruled out that after Kabardino-Balkaria, a similar logic may be applied to other republics of historical Circassia – primarily to Karachay-Cherkessia and Adygea, where residual forms of republican subjectivity and their own constitutional language also persist.

Against this background, the choice of time for introducing the amendments to the Constitution is also particularly concerning. The prosecutor’s office may have rashly decided that the actual state of war would automatically make any protest illegitimate and risky for expressing popular discontent. But such a calculation is dangerous for the authorities themselves. If people are presented with a fait accompli and made to understand that their republic, its Constitution, history, and national dignity mean nothing in the face of a departmental decision, this will not strengthen stability but undermine it. Ignoring the anxieties of society does not resolve the problem – it drives it inward, turning a legal dispute into a question of trust, and a question of trust eventually becomes a political crisis. The sooner the authorities listen to society and halt the process, the lower the cost of resolving this situation will be.

The KBR Constitution – a question for the entire Circassian world

Special attention must be paid to the position of the Circassian diaspora, because for it, the issue of the KBR Constitution is not an external regional dispute, but a question of preserving a living connection with the historical homeland. On June 14, more than forty Circassian and Caucasian organizations issued an appeal to the leadership and parliament of the KBR, demanding the preservation of constitutional guarantees of the statehood, security, and territorial integrity of the republic.

Their anxiety is understandable: after the Russo-Caucasian War, the genocide, the exile, and the scattering of Circassians across different countries, it is the national republics in the Caucasus that remain those few institutional pillars through which the nation preserves not only its memory but also the hope for return, cultural reintegration, and participation in the life of their native land. The weakening of the KBR’s status strikes a blow not only to the residents of the republic, but to the entire Circassian world. For Kabardino-Balkaria, this is an issue of land, powers, internal balance, and respect for its republican status; for the diaspora, it is a question of the future of a people who do not want to be reduced to folklore without a political-legal connection to historical Circassia.

It would be wise for the Russian authorities to take this voice into account. The Circassian diaspora is an international network of communities, organizations, lawyers, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and public figures in Turkey, Europe, the United States, Jordan, Israel, Syria, and other countries. Demonstrative disregard for its position will be perceived as a new act of alienation.

At the same time, the diaspora itself can and must act systematically: translate appeals into Turkish, English, Arabic, and European languages; work with parliaments, parties, human rights organizations, and expert centers in their countries of residence; engage lawyers specializing in the rights of indigenous peoples and federalism; form a unified coordinating committee for the defense of the republican status of the KBR, KCR, and Adygea; ensure that the question of preserving the Circassian republics ceases to be an internal bureaucratic topic and is understood as a question of historical justice, Caucasian stability, and the preservation of a people, a significant part of whom ended up outside their homeland.

We wish to draw attention to the fact that during the Second World War, the Shapsug National District on the Black Sea coast of historical Circassia was liquidated. Despite significant efforts and extensive work carried out by the Circassian public in the 1990s, it was not possible to restore this district.

Dear compatriots! We call upon all Circassians and all residents of the KBR to stand up in defense of their Republic.

We must not comfort ourselves with self-deception. The situation is extremely serious and requires the full mobilization of all our forces, both in the homeland and in the diaspora. But the efforts of Circassians alone may not be enough. It seems necessary to conduct extensive explanatory work among the region’s population and combine collective efforts with all residents of the republic and representatives of other national republics.

If we can mobilize public opinion together, the prosecutor’s office may back down from its plans. If we show negligence, we may finally lose our national republics during the next cycle of their dismantling under the pretext of “amending local norms to align with federal legislation.”

The constitution of a republic is not a departmental instruction, nor is it a wall newspaper in the lobby of someone’s private business or security agency. A republic is a common cause, the cause of the people, and its constitution cannot be changed as if it were a technical edit to regulations. Especially since they want to change the substance of several key articles.

Together with the people of the Republic, public figures, and representatives of the diaspora, we insist: the Constitution of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic must be preserved in its current edition. The first sensible step should not be pushing the amendments through, but completely halting this process, publicly explaining the position of the prosecutor’s office, publishing all legal justifications, and organizing a broad public discussion. In the extreme case, if the authorities still insist on changing the key provisions of the Constitution, the issue must be put to a referendum. No departmental decision can replace the will of the people on a matter that concerns the future of the republic.

We remind you that Article 4 of the Constitution of the KBR states: Power in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic belongs to the people. The people of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic shall exercise their power directly, as well as through state authorities and local self-government bodies. The highest direct expression of the power of the people of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic shall be referendums and free elections.

The prosecutor’s office has raised vital questions concerning the amendment of the KBR Constitution and the future of its people. It is absolutely clear that such questions require a referendum and must not be imposed on the people without taking their will into account. Only such an approach to resolving this issue can be legitimate in the eyes of the population. All attempts to bypass the procedure of popular will expression will sooner or later inevitably face a counter-reaction and demands for the restoration of the status quo as soon as the pendulum of history swings back.

If the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation continues to exert pressure on the Parliament of the KBR, we can propose the creation of a Conciliation Commission for the preparation and conduct of a referendum, which will include representatives of the executive and legislative authorities of the republic, independent lawyers, historians, representatives of the public, and national and human rights organizations.

Society will extend its full support to the Head of the Republic and the Parliament if they take a principled stand. Otherwise, these representatives of the executive and legislative authorities of the Republic will go down in history as people who failed to perform their functions of protecting the interests of Kabardino-Balkaria.

Conclusion

A republic is not an ownerless administrative unit, but a constituent entity of the Federation with a historically established territory, population, and the right to respectful treatment.

The authorities’ disregard for the justified concerns of the people of Kabardino-Balkaria could lead to unpredictable consequences. This is not a threat to the state. On the contrary, it is the normal reaction of a responsible society that understands the significance of the Constitution and does not want fateful issues to pass by it without proper discussion and consideration of the people’s opinion.

When such concern is portrayed as hostility, separatism, or rocking the boat, the authorities embark on a bad path that drives the problem inward, increases distrust, and leaves people feeling that they are not being heard.

Today, public figures of the KBR and Circassians around the world speak of preserving constitutional guarantees, federalism, the dignity of the republic, and respect for its historical specifics, and they expect an honest answer: what is the Republic’s authority ready to do to ensure that the anxiety of society is not ignored?

For now, the authorities can exit this situation with dignity: listen to society, recognize the error of a hasty approach, and halt the process. But if the anxiety of the people is ignored, the responsibility for the further growth of distrust will fall not on the public figures who warned of the risks, but on those who preferred to push the decision through, disregarding the opinion of the republic.

Our demand is simple and lawful: do not touch the Constitution of the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, preserve the active guarantees of statehood, territorial integrity, and republican subjectivity. If the authorities truly respect the people of the KBR, they must stop this process now. If the issue is nevertheless put up for alteration, then it must be decided not by a narrow circle of officials and not by the departmental logic of the prosecutor’s office, but by the people of the republic themselves through a referendum. Anything else will be perceived as an imposed decision, made without the consent of society, and will inevitably increase distrust, alienation, and social-political tension in this already difficult period.

The Adyghe nation lives!
Center for Strategic Studies of the Circassian Socio-Political Organization “Khabze”.